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ABSTRACT 
Hardware security has risen in prominence in recent years with concerns stemming from a globalizing 
semiconductor supply chain and increased third-party IP (intellectual property) usage. Trojan detection is 
of paramount importance for ensuring systems with confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Existing 
methods for hardware Trojan detection in FPGA (field programmable gate array) devices include test-time 
methods, pre-implementation methods, and run-time methods. The first two methods provide effective 
ways of detecting some Trojans; however, Trojans may be specifically designed to avoid detection at test-
time or before implementation making run-time detection a more attractive option. Run-time detection and 
removal of Trojans is highly desirable due to the wide range of critical systems which are deployed on 
FPGAs and may be difficult or costly to remove from operation. Many parallels can be drawn between 
hardware and natural systems, and one example creates an analogy between hardware attacks and 
biological attacks. We propose a CRISPR-Cas-inspired (clustered regularly interspaced palindromic 
repeats) method for detecting hardware Trojans in FPGAs. The fundamental concepts of the Type 1-E 
CRISPR-Cas mechanism are discussed and simulated to predict the flow of genetic information through 
this biological system. The basic structure of this system is utilized to propose a novel run-time Trojan 
detection method titled CADEFT (CRISPR-Cas-based Algorithm for DEtection of FPGA Trojans). 
Different levels of FPGA application design flow are explored, and CADEFT is proposed for realization 
at the bitstream level to monitor the configuration bitstream and the run-time properties of the FPGA. The 
flexibility of CADEFT originates in the CRISPR-Cas mechanism’s ability to recognize similar albeit 
previously unseen patterns which may pose a threat to the system.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The impact of electronic systems on society and modern life 
cannot be overstated. At its core, this continuing 
technological transformation is driven by microelectronic 
devices. With such a profound reach into the very fabric of 
society and civilization, the safety, security, and reliability of 
such devices and systems are paramount concerns. The 
significance of software security research has long been 
apparent; however, the last two decades have seen many 
organizations realize the implications of vulnerabilities in the 
hardware domain. Accordingly, research in both hardware 
and software security fields has expanded tremendously with 
renewed interest in potential hardware vulnerabilities and 
mitigation mechanisms. There is a push to better understand 
the limitations and weaknesses of hardware systems 
especially in the wake of several major revelations regarding 
hardware vulnerabilities including Meltdown, Rowhammer, 
Spectre, and Spoiler, all examples of recent state-of-the-art 
microarchitectural attacks [1]. Threats to hardware systems 
are diverse and range from hardware Trojans to IP piracy and 
reverse engineering [2]. As such, proposed defense and 
protection methods span a broad range of mechanisms 
including split manufacturing and fingerprinting among 
others. 
 With new or modified attack and defense methods 
continuously being introduced, the competition between 
designers and attackers, which has been likened to a game of 
‘cat and mouse,’ will persist. Especially within the realm of 
complex networks and systems, adaptive systems have long 
been the subject of much study and admiration. The ability 
to react and change dynamically based on internal or external 
stimuli such as environmental variations or a predator’s 
attack is a foundational aspect of biological organisms’ 
survival. This adaptivity is a coveted characteristic of 
biological systems which has applications not only in 
hardware security but also across a broad spectrum of 
electronic systems. 
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A. BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION & ADAPTATION 
The natural world contains many systems, both simple and 
complex, which are valuable sources of knowledge and 
inspiration for fields ranging from engineering to medicine to 
arts. One of nature’s most intriguing and heavily studied areas 
is evolution and the variety of mechanisms which make it 
possible. Evolution concerns the change in an organism’s 
characteristics over multiple generations via a selection 
process. Generally, offspring with characteristics more 
favorable to their environment have a higher likelihood of 
survival and of passing their characteristics to the next 
generation. While knowledge of evolution may be incomplete, 
it has inspired myriad approaches to challenges in areas like 
computer security, image identification, and natural language 
processing among others. 
Although evolution plays a central role in the adaptivity and 
survival of biological organisms, it is not alone. Natural 
evolution is a tremendous resource because billions of years 
of evolution have produced not only myriad organisms but 
also a wide array of adaptive systems within these organisms. 
Even within prokaryotic microorganisms, several systems 
exist for defense and adaptation purposes including restriction 
modification (RM) systems, CRISPR-Cas systems, abortive 
infection systems, and lateral gene transfer among others. 
Certain microorganisms may possess more than one of 
these systems granting it multiple opportunities to adapt and 
survive in the face of threats. Altogether, these cellular defense 
and adaptation systems are powerful mechanisms honed 
through evolutionary processes which help to protect the 
organism and increase its chances of survival. Despite their 
relationship to one another, one major distinction can be made 
between evolution and these defense and adaptation systems. 
Evolution concerns changes which occur over multiple 
generations, or intergenerational changes; however, the 
changes induced via the defense and adaptation systems 
previously described normally occur during a single 
generation and can be classified as intragenerational changes. 
B. EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS  
Evolutionary algorithms refer to a broad subset of 
optimization algorithms which draw inspiration from 
biological evolution mechanisms like reproduction, mutation, 
and selection. In general, these algorithms rely on “survival of 
the fittest” criteria whereby organisms or instances are evolved 
via one of the aforementioned mechanisms and their fitness is 
calculated in some manner. This fitness metric is used to make 
a determination regarding the organism’s survival and ability 
to pass on its characteristics to future generations. While 
CRISPR-Cas mechanisms and evolution are certainly related, 
there is an important distinction. Evolution and algorithms 
based on evolutionary characteristics demonstrate adaptation 
between generations; however, CRISPR-Cas systems enable 
adaptation within a single generation. From a biological 
standpoint, this is significant because it allows an organism 
like Escherichia coli to adapt to threats during its lifetime and 
pass these characteristics on to its offspring instead of relying 
solely on mechanisms like reproduction, mutation, or selection 
to enable the offspring to survive similar threats. CRISPR’s 
relationship with evolution and reproduction is important as 
the efficacy of the mechanism is enabled in part by the ability 
to pass down to offspring acquired genetic information 
regarding threats to the cell’s survival. The close natural 
relationship between the CRISPR-Cas mechanism and 
evolution indicates that a synthetic implementation of a 
cohesive system should be not only possible but also effective. 
C. FPGAs  
Field-programmable gate arrays, or FPGAs, are designed as 
flexible hardware platforms which can be configured for a 
wide variety of applications. This versatility along with 
growth in FPGA capacity and complexity has led to their 
adoption in dozens of fields including aerospace, automotive, 
bioinformatics, consumer electronics, high-performance 
computing, medical, and wireless communications among 
others [3].  
With their widespread usage across industries, valid 
concerns have been raised regarding the security of these 
systems. The versatility of FPGAs is a drawback from this 
perspective as hardware vulnerabilities which affect one 
FPGA are likely effective across many or all other FPGA 
devices. The distribution of these systems means that a Trojan 
or other hardware attack could potentially disrupt critical 
systems or infrastructure resulting in a catastrophe for 
companies or even countries. In efforts to mitigate these risks, 
research into hardware security and FPGA Trojans and 
vulnerabilities specifically has increased significantly, and a 
wide variety of detection and tolerance strategies have been 
proposed to mitigate or eliminate both Trojans and the issues 
they cause. 
D. HARDWARE SECURITY  
Hardware security is a broad term referring to the protection 
of physical devices from vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities 
can manifest as IP piracy, counterfeiting, hardware Trojans, 
physical tampering, side-channel attacks, and fault attacks 
among others. Methods for ensuring hardware security are 
varied, and implementation options and details depend greatly 
on the electronic system being studied; however, at its core, 
hardware security concerns security and trust from a hardware 
perspective. Hardware security is a hot topic in the electronic 
systems industry due to its relatively recent emergence into the 
collective psyche of the industry. Throughout hardware supply 
chains, vulnerabilities are being sought out and investigated to 
prevent potential hardware attacks and other issues like 
overproduction and counterfeiting. 
E. CONNECTING BIOLOGY TO HARDWARE SECURITY  
When comparing nature to artificial systems, many parallels 
can be drawn. One example of this lies in the relationship 
between microorganisms and bacteriophages and the 
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relationship between hardware systems and hardware attacks. 
A quintessential “cat-and-mouse game”, this relationship is a 
story of co-evolution and adaptation as one organism develops 
a mechanism or mechanisms which outmaneuvers the 
mechanisms of the other organism. In the case of a microbe, 
this could be the development of an immune-like response to 
the detection of a specific bacteriophage. In the case of a 
bacteriophage, it could be the modification of specific proteins 
to prevent binding or interference by the microbe’s systems.  
Biologically-inspired defense mechanisms have been 
studied in detail for use in cyber and software systems; 
however, their utility in hardware systems has yet to attract 
comparable attention. Several works including [4,5,6] detail 
potential hardware defense systems based on natural 
phenomena, but to the author’s knowledge, no work has 
focused on developing a hardware defense mechanism based 
on CRISPR-Cas as a sub-cell process.  
F. THIS PAPER  
This paper begins by examining the biological mechanisms 
of the CRISPR-Cas adaptive immunity system. It summarizes 
the phases of the Type 1-E CRISPR-Cas system present in 
Escherichia coli and significant components of this system. 
Next, a biological model is presented which explains the flow 
of genetic information through the CRISPR-Cas system, and 
simulations are presented to demonstrate the genetic 
mechanisms which enable the system to effectively regulate 
foreign genetic material. Hardware Trojans are discussed in 
greater detail including methods used to prevent, detect, and 
remove them from FPGA systems. The FPGA design flow is 
described and examined for the feasibility of Trojan insertion 
and realization of schemes for Trojan detection. In connecting 
biology to hardware security in an explicit manner, CRISPR-
Cas-inspired methods for detection of Trojans in FPGA 
devices are proposed and described. Finally, this paper 
concludes with a discussion of future work in FPGA Trojan 
detection. 
 
II. CRISPR-CAS INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, the biology world has been 
abuzz with the implications of Clustered Regularly 
Interspaced Palindromic Repeats, or CRISPR, systems for use 
in both research and industry. Recent years have seen 
significant investment and research interest in developing 
functional, controllable CRISPR systems. With the potential 
to edit genetic code accurately, most attention has been 
focused on the possibilities within biology, medicine, and 
bioinformatics. Along with its promise for creating new 
medicines and gene therapies, the underlying mechanisms of 
CRISPR have tremendous potential in other fields like 
designing novel paradigms for hardware security. One benefit 
CRISPR systems have over other evolutionary development 
or adaptation systems is their ability to learn and adapt within 
and across generations. Many evolutionary algorithms rely on 
large numbers of generations to make gradual changes to 
arrive at an optimal solution, and while this can be a highly 
effective method of adaptation and development, CRISPR 
presents this intergenerational capability along with 
intragenerational adaptation. The CRISPR system is one 
mechanism some microorganisms have developed to repel 
attackers. 
CRISPR-Cas systems refer to an array of adaptive, 
immunity-conferring systems within bacteria and archaea. 
These systems have been identified in approximately 90% of 
archaeal genomes and 40% of bacterial genomes [7]. At a 
basic level, CRISPR is a system with a genetic memory bank 
of nucleotide sequences the organism has encountered, or its 
ancestors have encountered. CRISPR systems are composed 
of three phases: adaptation (also called acquisition), 
expression, and interference. 
A. ADAPTATION 
The adaptation phase saves new genetic material called 
spacers into the organism’s CRISPR locus allowing the 
organism to “remember” specific genetic sequences it has 
previously encountered. CRISPR loci are akin to memory 
banks which store copies of this genetic code. These loci are 
located either within the organism’s genome or in plasmids 
within the organism. Methods of acquisition vary across 
different microorganisms; however, this work primarily 
focuses on the type 1-E CRISPR system of Escherichia coli. 
CRISPR acquisition mechanisms are typically classified as 
either naïve or primed. Naïve adaptation is the simpler form of 
acquisition where any genetic material of sufficient length can 
be acquired and inserted into the CRISPR locus; however, this 
method has no filter which can lead to the acquisition of both 
foreign and host genetic sequences resulting in multiple 
spacers in the locus which are not capable of immune response 
[8]. CRISPR-associated proteins Cas1 and Cas2 are 
responsible for naïve adaptation after they form a Cas1-Cas2 
complex which requires 2 Cas1 proteins and 1 Cas2 protein 
[9]. This complex diffuses through the cell until it encounters 
foreign DNA from which it selects a PAM (protospacer 
adjacent motif) and a protospacer. After the spacer is 
processed, it is placed into the CRISPR locus where it is 
flanked by two repeat sequences which denote where the 
spacer begins and ends. On the other hand, primed adaptation 
requires more Cas proteins and a CRISPR RNA to recognize 
a partially matching target sequence. In primed acquisition, the 
Cascade complex carries a crRNA sequence which enables it 
to recognize complementary or near-complementary 
sequences of foreign DNA. If the crRNA sequence is near-
complementary to some sequence in the foreign DNA and the 
appropriate PAM is expressed after this sequence in the 
foreign DNA, the Cascade complex will flag it as a 
protospacer for incorporation into the locus. Within at least 
certain E. coli strains, both naïve and primed adaptation 
mechanisms are present [10]. The processes occurring during 
the adaptation phase are shown in Figure 1(A).  
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B. EXPRESSION 
During the expression phase, crRNAs are produced and bind 
with Cascade complexes to form Cascade:crRNA complexes 
which are capable of interference and primed adaptation [11]. 
To start, a long pre-crRNA sequence is transcribed from the 
DNA in the CRISPR locus. This pre-crRNA sequence 
contains transcriptions of both spacers and repeats from the 
locus. The pre-crRNA sequence is processed and cleaved into 
smaller units which contain a full spacer transcribed sequence 
flanked by partial repeat sequences on both sides. The mature 
crRNA then binds with a Cascade complex to begin its search 
for complementary genetic material. The expression processes 
are displayed in Figure 1(B). 
C. INTERFERENCE  
As Cascade:crRNA complexes search the cell via diffusion, 
they encounter foreign genetic sequences. If the crRNA 
sequence carried by this complex is complementary or near-
complementary to part of the foreign DNA and the foreign 
DNA has the appropriate PAM, or protospacer adjacent motif, 
the Cascade complex will bind to the target site. After binding, 
a Cas3 nuclease is recruited to the target site for degradation 
of the target DNA. This degradation destroys the foreign DNA 
by cleaving it; however, in Cas3 deficient systems, the 
Cascade complex will remain bound to the complementary 
foreign DNA sequence. While this action does not cleave the 
foreign DNA, it has a similar effect in that expression of the 
foreign DNA is prevented limiting or eliminating the threat of 
this foreign DNA. This type of binding is often used in 
CRISPR experiments for gene silencing where specific 
sequences are not removed but instead are blocked from 
expression. If the foreign DNA has no sequence 
complementary to or near-complementary to the crRNA, the 
Cascade:crRNA complex continues its search, leaving behind 
the foreign DNA. The interference processes are shown in 
Figure 1(C). 
D. THE ROLE OF RNA AND DNA  
Deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, and ribonucleic acid, or 
RNA, are nucleic acids which form the building blocks of life. 
Along with complex carbohydrates, proteins, and lipids, 
nucleic acids are one of four chief macromolecules vital for all 
known lifeforms. DNA is a molecule with a double-helix 
orientation caused by the coiling of two polynucleotide strands 
around one another. These polynucleotide strands are 
composed of nucleotides which contain cytosine (C), guanine 
(G), adenine (A), or thymine (T). These four chemical bases 
serve as a code which stores the information in DNA. The 
bases pair up together to form base pairs where A and T are 
paired, and G and C are paired [12]. Both polynucleotide 
chains within DNA code for the same activity. Unlike DNA, 
RNA is a single chain polynucleotide and is often folded upon 
itself when found in nature. Various RNA molecules are active 
within cells, and viruses often have their genetic information 
encoded as RNA within their genome. RNA shares 3 of the 4 
chemical bases with DNA with uracil (U) in place of thymine. 
In the context of this work, RNA and DNA are related via the 
transcription process whereby an RNA strand is transcribed 
from a DNA template (as in pre-crRNA formation) and the 
reverse transcription process whereby a DNA sequence is 
generated from an RNA template (as in creation of a new 
DNA spacer in the locus from an RNA sequence via naïve or 
primed adaptation.) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.  Phases of the Type 1-E CRISPR-Cas mechanism. (A) shows 
the adaptation phase including both naïve and primed adaptation. 
During this phase, spacers are added to the CRISPR locus which 
provide a memory of previously encountered genetic information. (B) 
shows the expression phase during which the CRISPR locus is 
transcribed to crRNAs which guide Cascade complexes. (C) displays 
the interference phase during which Cascade:crRNA complexes seek 
out fully or nearly complementary genetic sequences and initiate a 
response based on this pairing.  
E. PAM SEQUENCE SIGNIFICANCE  
The protospacer adjacent motif, or PAM, is a 2-6 nucleotide 
long sequence which follows the foreign DNA targeted by the 
Cascade:crRNA complex. These PAM sequences are 
components of the invading bacteriophage or plasmid which 
are not parts of the microorganism’s CRISPR locus. This is an 
important detail which ultimately determines how the 
5 
Cascade:crRNA complex determines what to do with the 
genetic information it has encountered. If the PAM sequence 
were to match a nucleotide sequence adjacent to the spacers of 
the CRISPR locus, the microorganism’s Cascade:crRNA 
complexes would degrade and destroy the CRISPR locus. 
Instead, the PAM sequences serve to prevent autoimmunity 
issues like this. Even if the spacer sequence and a subsequence 
of the foreign genetic material are complementary, without the 
proper PAM sequences in the foreign genetic material, the 
Cascade:crRNA complex will not successfully bind to the 
target, recruit Cas3 for cleaving, or engage in primed 
adaptation. 
III. FPGA DESIGN 
FPGA design can be separated into two distinct product flows. 
First, the FPGA device itself, or the base array, is designed and 
manufactured by companies like Xilinx or Altera via now 
worldwide supply chains. This is the portion of FPGA design 
which the manufacturer alone is responsible for. The second 
product flow is the FPGA application design flow which 
entails the design of the application to run on the FPGA and 
the configuration of the FPGA to implement this application. 
Design of this application is carried out by an application 
developer and is typically accomplished using software tools 
provided by the vendor. Security is a concern through both of 
these product design flows. 
A. BASE ARRAY FABRICATION DESIGN FLOW 
Design of the FPGA base array follows a standard IC 
development flow directed by the manufacturer. Using 
standard design tools and libraries, the base array is designed, 
fabricated at a foundry, and tested. Following fabrication and 
testing, the device is normally shipped to a different facility 
where it is packaged and undergoes final testing. This base 
array device is then sent to either the final customer or a 
distributor. Because the base array design follows a standard 
integrated circuit design and manufacturing process, it is a 
party to the same issues in supply chain security and trust 
including reverse-engineering, tampering, and overproduction 
among others [3]. This serves to illustrate that vulnerabilities 
exist not only in the application design phase of FPGA design 
flow but also in the base array design flow.     
B. APPLICATION DESIGN FLOW  
The application design flow typically utilizes FPGA vendor 
tools alongside commercial EDA tools. A visual 
representation of the application design flow is shown in 
Figure 3. Preliminary design process steps include the 
development of project requirements and problem description. 
Architecture design follows these prerequisites and entails 
analysis of the project requirements and problem description. 
This step results in a description of the system’s architecture, 
structure, functions, and interconnects. Next, the architectural 
design is described in hardware description language (HDL) 
concurrently with the development of test environments or 
behavioral models for evaluating the correctness of the 
system’s HDL description. During this step, the application 
designer might integrate intellectual property and design 
information from several sources which could include FPGA 
vendor and third-party libraries, original and repurposed HDL 
code, and microprocessor software [3]. Following these 
parallel steps, the correctness of the HDL is verified via 
comparison to the behavioral model. If there are issues at this 
stage, the HDL description is revisited to make any necessary 
adjustments. Once the design passes the behavioral simulation 
check, the HDL description is synthesized into a netlist which 
contains the schematic of the digital circuit to be implemented 
on the FPGA. If there are no issues with synthesis, this netlist 
can then be mapped to the device’s internals which consists of 
placing and routing which allocates FPGA resources. This is a 
significant step as it can be viewed as going from general to 
specific. A generic design in the form of a gate-level netlist 
may be implemented in any capable FPGA device, but the 
implementation (placing and routing) configures the 
information in the netlist for a specific FPGA. After 
implementation, a timing analysis is performed to ensure the 
implemented design meets timing requirements. Finally, the 
bitstream generated during implementation is passed to the 
FPGA. In general, this process can be broken down into the 
following levels: behavioral level, register-transfer level 
(RTL), gate level, and bitstream level. The different steps of 
the application design flow and the four levels of application 
design are shown in Figure 2. 
 
FIGURE 2.  FPGA Design Flow. The FPGA design flow displayed above 
depicts the application design process and is broken into four levels: 
behavioral, register-transfer, gate, and bitstream.  
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IV. HARDWARE TROJANS 
Hardware Trojans refer to a broad range of malicious 
alterations made to the circuitry of electronic systems with the 
goal of yielding some adverse effect. These modifications are 
typically made without the designer’s knowledge. As 
mentioned before, the supply chain presents many 
opportunities for Trojan insertion due to the globalization of 
the semiconductor business. Nowadays, it is rare for hardware 
design companies to have their own foundry as it is less 
expensive to outsource this and other stages of the hardware 
security supply chain to other companies who specialize in one 
of these areas. While this may bring costs down, it also limits 
the oversight hardware designers have over the process while 
increasing the number of players in the supply chain opening 
the hardware to more attack vectors.  
Regarding FPGAs, the global supply chain is slightly 
different than for some other electronic systems as FPGAs are 
manufactured by a vendor while hardware designers create the 
IP which runs on the system. This has been even further 
outsourced of late with commercially available off-the-shelf 
(COTS) IP blocks from FPGA vendors. Split manufacturing 
has been proposed as a potential solution to some of the 
hardware security issues posed by a globalized supply chain 
with third-party fabrication; however, split manufacturing 
alone will not solve challenges to hardware security and is not 
without drawbacks of its own [13]. Not only does split 
manufacturing increase the cost and complexity of hardware 
designs, but it also is not impervious to additional hardware-
based attacks including reverse-engineering and Trojan 
insertion.  
Trojans have typically been classified by their trigger and 
payload. The trigger refers to the way the Trojan is activated 
which could be internal or external. For example, 
circumstances which could activate the trigger include an 
external event like user input or the output of another 
component or an internal event based on time or the physical 
condition of the device like its temperature. The Trojan’s 
payload refers to the malicious effects it causes after being 
activated. Examples of Trojan payload types include device 
functionality changes, performance downgrades, information 
leakage, and denial-of-service. In [14], Collins discusses 
Trojan taxonomies and proposes a new taxonomy for Trojans 
in FPGA IP to elucidate the threats these Trojans present to 
hardware designs. He breaks Trojans in FPGA IP into three 
major segments based on their payload: Trojans that cause 
malfunction, Trojans that cause side effects, and Trojans that 
introduce vulnerabilities. Threats to hardware security can 
occur at various points during the life cycle of a hardware 
system including during design time, fabrication time, test 
time, and post-deployment [15]. Bao describes potential 
threats for each of these phases which can include but are not 
limited to hardware and software Trojans, IP piracy, IC piracy, 
overproduction, denial-of-service, recycling, reverse-
engineering, brute-force attacks, and side-channel attacks. 
While many of these threats may be a concern or vulnerability 
in hardware systems, this work focuses on Trojan-based 
attacks which can occur at any point during the life cycle of an 
electronic system like an FPGA. One significant aspect of 
research into hardware Trojans covers approaches to mitigate 
their effects which includes designing systems which prevent, 
detect, or tolerate Trojans. The distinction between the three 
mitigation methods is significant. Trojan prevention schemes 
aim to eliminate the possibility of Trojans in hardware via a 
variety of novel design techniques. Trojan detection schemes 
enable designers to identify Trojans in their systems during 
either test-time or run-time; on the other hand, Trojan 
tolerance strategies enable a hardware system to operate 
normally despite the presence of one or more Trojans [14]. 
This work focuses on Trojan detection but also provides some 
context on Trojan tolerancing methods. 
A. TROJAN INSERTION 
Current research suggests that hardware Trojans can be 
inserted into electronic systems in several different ways. For 
FPGA devices, Trojan insertion is possible during both the 
base array design flow and the application design flow. In the 
base array design and fabrication, Trojans can be inserted at 
various points in the supply chain including during the design 
and layout phase via tools used create this design or during 
fabrication by an attacker with physical access to the device. 
Trojans in the base array design could be implemented in 
fewer than 100 gates [16], an extremely small area in modern 
process nodes. On the other hand, Trojans could be inserted at 
RTL, gate level, or bitstream level of the application design 
flow. An exhaustive list of the types of possible Trojans and 
their insertion methods for both of these design flows is not 
presented in this work.  
B. TROJAN PREVENTION 
Trojan prevention aims to thwart Trojan insertion thus 
negating the need for detection and subsequent tolerancing or 
removal. Methods for creating a preventative deterrent include 
various hardware obfuscation methods like that proposed by 
Chakraborty and Bhunia in [17]. One major limitation of 
devoting significant efforts toward Trojan prevention at the 
expense of detection and tolerancing methods is the 
incomplete knowledge regarding Trojans and their insertion 
methods. Comprehensive prevention is a lofty goal which 
would require extensive and potentially cost-prohibitive 
examination of each step of FPGA base array fabrication and 
application design. There is no one catch-all approach to 
addressing potential issues stemming from hardware Trojans. 
Alternatively, examining the issue of hardware Trojans from 
multiple perspectives including prevention, detection, 
tolerancing, and removal is likely the most effective tactic.   
C. TROJAN DETECTION  
Trojan detection relies on the ability to identify potential 
Trojans in the hardware design; however, this is complicated 
by the sheer number of possible test vectors for a system like 
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an FPGA. Detection methods can be separated into two 
categories: destructive and non-destructive. Destructive 
techniques, like observation under a microscope, are not 
suitable for Trojans which are hidden in FPGA IP because this 
technique calls for hardware observation. For FPGA systems, 
non-destructive techniques include examining code and/or 
netlists provided by third-party IP vendors, but this requires a 
significant engineering effort and does not guarantee that a 
Trojan will be found if it does exist in the IP.  
Logical testing is another method of Trojan detection in 
FPGA IP whereby extensive logical coverage is used. With 
current testing abilities, it would be infeasible or impossible to 
test every possible input pattern sufficiently for an FPGA due 
to exponential scaling as the combinational state-space 
increases in size. Strategies like MERO [18] aim to make 
Trojan detection more efficient in a massive test space and 
maximize device coverage while minimizing testing time. 
MERO functions via the identification of low likelihood states 
for every node and the creation of test vectors which 
intentionally activate those states multiple times. The intuition 
behind this strategy relies on the assumption that hardware 
Trojans are likely to be embedded in low probability states to 
avoid detection during testing, and by probing these low 
probability states, the detection of Trojans fitting this 
description would be possible [19]. These logical testing 
approaches typically utilize a coverage metric to gauge the 
likelihood of Trojans avoiding detection which may be 
accomplished via random samples of known Trojans and 
triggers placed at various points throughout the circuit [18]. 
Combining the results of these tests enables the development 
of the aforementioned metric for measuring trigger and 
detection coverage; however, the test set for this method must 
be comprehensive so as to provide acceptable coverage [19]. 
Because it is unlikely that all possible Trojans could be 
detected during testing, it is desirable to be able to monitor the 
system during run-time for anomalous behavior which may 
indicate the presence of a Trojan. 
D. TROJAN TOLERANCING AND REMOVAL  
Trojan tolerancing refers to designing with the intent of 
making the system tolerant of or resilient against Trojans 
which remain undetected after testing. Two major methods of 
Trojan tolerancing include run-time monitoring and 
alternative run-time techniques. Provided the monitoring 
mechanism is sufficiently comprehensive, run-time 
monitoring is an effective method for nearly all hardware 
Trojans [14]. One common technique for run-time monitoring 
is redundancy with a majority voting scheme like Triple 
Modular Redundancy (TMR) [20] and related schema. The 
basis of TMR is the utilization of three redundant, identical 
versions of the IP which are acquired from different vendors 
and the assumption that the same Trojan is unlikely to exist in 
all versions. This method only provides protection from 
logical errors in the FPGA circuitry caused by a Trojan which 
would otherwise present an incorrect result in a single FPGA. 
Information leakage and other malicious activities are still 
possible with a majority voting redundancy scheme, so various 
improvements to this mechanism have been proposed. 
Alanwar et al. propose various modular redundant systems 
along with Simple Blockage (SB) for data obfuscation [21]. 
While this may be effective in the mitigation of information 
leakage Trojans, the implementation of a communication 
protocol in the IP would preclude the utilization of SB; 
otherwise, the protocol may not function properly. No current 
Trojan tolerance systems are capable of resilience against all 
types of side effect-generating Trojans [14]. Because Trojan 
tolerancing is normally undertaken by considering only one or 
a few Trojans, its utility and robustness against a wide array of 
different Trojans may be more limited than Trojan detection. 
V. A BIOLOGICAL CRISPR-CAS MODEL 
While modeling the entirety of a cell or organism like E. 
coli is certainly an attractive proposition, this capability is 
currently beyond the reach of modern technology. Whole-cell 
simulations would be an incredible asset for not only the 
biology field but also the medical and pharmaceutical fields 
among others. In 2012, J. Craig Venter Institute researchers 
reported a basic whole-cell simulation of Mycoplasma 
genitalium which accounted for all the pathogen’s molecular 
components and their interactions [22]. Despite this step 
forward, many contended that this simulation only modeled a 
fraction of the eventual requirements for a realistic simulation 
of M. genitalium let alone other, more complex 
microorganisms [23]. This organism has only 525 genes while 
an organism like E. coli has 4,288 genes and human cells are 
considerably more complex than even that. The researchers 
reported that the simulation of a single cell division took 
approximately 10 hours and generated half of a gigabyte of 
data [23]. It is almost a certainty that computing technology 
will continue to advance; however, this anecdote serves to 
show that at current rates of development, computing 
technology is a long way from comprehensive whole-cell 
simulations. Despite these limitations, models and simulations 
of sub-cell processes will continue to improve offering an 
unprecedented look into intracellular and intercellular 
dynamics. The CRISPR mechanism is one such process which 
has been modeled to better understand how modifications to a 
cell’s genetic code are made. 
A. EXISTING CRISPR-CAS MODELS  
Most current CRISPR-Cas models focus on only a 
subprocess or subprocesses of the CRISPR mechanism as 
opposed to a complete model which takes all 3 phases into 
account. The comprehensive biological mechanisms of 
CRISPR-Cas systems are not currently understood making it 
impossible to design a full-system implementation which 
accounts for all dynamics and interactions. Existing 
simulations like [24] and [25] provide a look into differential 
equation-based modeling of CRISPR-Cas9 with a focus on the 
expression and interference stages. 
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Farasat and Salis [24] designed a CRISPR-Cas9-based 
model to better characterize the variables which control the 
system’s on-target and off-target activity. Their system-wide 
biophysical model predicts how variations in “guide RNA 
sequences, DNA superhelical densities, Cas9 and crRNA 
expression levels, organisms and growth conditions, and 
experimental conditions” together regulate cleavage and 
binding at DNA sites using statistical kinetics and 
thermodynamics. Expression, Cas9-crRNA complex 
formation, and DNA target binding are the central components 
of this model. The model utilizes data from existing 
experiments to predict off-target binding activity and to better 
understand the high off-target activity of Cas9. The model 
results are used to make proposals for limiting off-target 
activity in future experiments. 
Building on the work of [24], Lavington [25] describes 
inaccuracies in the editing efficiency and off-target effects of 
biological CRISPR systems. Using similar mechanistic and 
biophysical parameters, this work investigates targeting 
efficiency with variations in the guide RNA sequence with a 
specific focus on R-loop formation which occurs when the 
Cas9-gRNA complex binds with a DNA site. Using 
experimental data, the model accounts for position 
dependence, base pair composition dependence, and 
consecutive mismatch effects. The plots in Figure 8 below 
demonstrate the depletion of dCas9 and crRNA molecules 
through the formation of intermediate complexes. The 
intermediate complexes eventually settle into the most stable 
state as demonstrated in the plot of isomerized complex 
expression. Overall, these plots display the simulation results 
of a differential equation-based approach to modeling 
CRISPR-Cas mechanisms. A Gambler’s Ruin Markov model 
was utilized as an analog for R-loop formation while the 
experimental data was fitted to the model to enable accurate 
forecasts of bacterial R-loop formations. Although the model 
simulates CRISPR-Cas9 dynamics during both the expression 
and interference phases, its primary focus is on a single step of 
the interference phase. 
B. MODEL CONSIDERATIONS  
The model described in this work is not concerned with the 
formation and movement of macromolecules and complexes 
but rather the flow of genetic information through a biological 
system and its impact on said system. Because of this, it is not 
intended to be a completely accurate model of all the 
biological processes which occur before, during, and after the 
CRISPR process; instead, its purpose is to serve as a basis for 
examining the mechanisms of the CRISPR process in the 
context of electronic systems and hardware security. 
Nevertheless, the model attempts to create a biologically 
accurate albeit simplified artificial version of the CRISPR-Cas 
mechanism. 
1) PRODUCTION AND DEGRADATION 
Within the cell, various proteins, nucleases, and other 
macromolecules are produced to fulfill myriad functions vital 
to the cell’s normal processes. Some of the key proteins in the 
type 1E CRISPR-Cas mechanism of Escherichia coli include 
Cas1, Cas2, Cas3, Cse1, Cse2, Cas7, Cas5e, and Cas6e. In 
naïve adaptation, Cas1 and Cas2 form a complex which 
recognizes genetic information and prepares it for integration 
as a spacer in the CRISPR locus. Cse1, Cse2, Cas7, Cas5e, and 
Cas6e together form the Cascade complex which works 
cooperatively with Cas 3 to recognize and degrade foreign 
genetic material identified as complementary to the RNA 
spacer the Cascade complex carries. The Cascade complex 
also has the ability to bind with foreign genetic material 
instead of degrading it thus preventing this foreign genetic 
material from causing damage to the cell. Additionally, the 
Cascade complex is a key component of primed adaptation. 
As with production, degradation of these macromolecules 
occurs with time and activity. The longer a macromolecule 
exists and the more active it is, the more quickly it will degrade 
and require replacement. In a healthy cell, the rates of 
degradation and production for each macromolecular are 
similar resulting in a stable population through time. To avoid 
unnecessary complexity and keeping in mind the end goal of 
this CRISPR model, macromolecule populations were kept 
constant and were directly related to the number of spacers 
added to the CRISPR locus and the number of RNA-guided 
Cascade complexes searching through foreign genetic 
material. 
 
 
2) DIFFUSION 
Two types of diffusion are noted in [26]: Brownian motion 
(self-diffusion) and transport diffusion. Self-diffusion is the 
stochastic movement of macromolecules in a fluid while 
transport diffusion is the natural movement of molecules from 
a region of high chemical potential to a region of low chemical 
potential. Self-diffusion is caused by macromolecule collision 
with smaller, rapidly moving molecules like water. In a model 
which intends to model accurately the specific dynamics of 
intracellular molecular movements, incorporating both self-
diffusion and transport diffusion would be critical. While 
diffusion does play a central role in the biological CRISPR-
Cas system through macromolecular interactions with one 
another and DNA or RNA, we do not consider diffusion in the 
simple model of CRISPR-Cas because we are more interested 
in the flow of and reaction to genetic information. In place of 
the randomness induced by diffusion, we randomly select 
which new spacers are introduced into the CRISPR locus. We 
also assume that, given sufficient populations of a mobile 
genetic element like a bacteriophage, all Cascade-RNA 
complexes encounter the mobile genetic element. While this 
may be a stretch of biological capabilities and a strong 
assumption about the number of bacteriophage elements 
present, it simplifies the extension to a hardware security 
focused CRISPR system. 
3) BINDING 
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Binding processes occur in all 3 phases of the CRISPR-Cas 
system. In the adaptation phase, Cas1 and Cas1 bind to form a 
Cas1-Cas2 complex which conducts the naïve adaptation 
search process. This complex binds with foreign genetic 
material which it brings to the CRISPR locus. In the 
expression phase, crRNAs bind with Cascade complexes to 
form search vectors which seek genetic information 
complementary to their RNA sequence. In the interference 
stage, these Cascade-RNA complexes bind with a genetic 
sequence and either utilize a near complementary sequence for 
primed adaptation or recruit Cas3 to degrade the genetic 
sequence. Similar to the diffusion process, binding is assumed 
and is not directly modeled in the simple CRISPR-Cas model 
discussed in this work. Intermolecular interactions could be 
taken into account; however, this would greatly increase the 
model complexity and add little value to the hardware security 
goal of the model. Binding affinities between spacer 
sequences and genetic sequences of an MGE are considered 
indirectly by PAM comparison which is discussed later.  
4) DNA AND RNA 
DNA and RNA are the central items of interest in this 
CRISPR-Cas model. From the beginning of the CRISPR 
mechanism, DNA and RNA play a vital role in the 
functionality of the system. In the adaptation phase, genetic 
sequence fragments are carried by the Cas1-Cas2 complex to 
the CRISPR locus where the sequence is stored as a DNA 
spacer sequence flanked by repeat sequences. The CRISPR 
locus is the library of all genetic sequences the organism has 
encountered and catalogued via naïve or primed adaptation. 
The ability to acquire new genetic information and incorporate 
it into the CRISPR locus forms the backbone of the 
mechanism’s adaptability. The transcription of CRISPR locus 
spacers from DNA to RNA allows for the binding of RNA 
sequences to Cascade complexes which protect the cell via 
interference and primed adaptation. To manage DNA and 
RNA sequences, the model uses the Biopython package [27]. 
This package has built in functions for parsing through genetic 
information stored in various file types as well as transcribing 
RNA from DNA and back-transcribing DNA from RNA.  
The model starts by initializing the CRISPR locus with only 
a leader sequence and a repeat. The leader sequence, from [7], 
denotes the beginning of the CRISPR locus and enables 
consistent and structured additions to the CRISPR locus by the 
Cas1-Cas2 and Cascade complexes [28]. This leader also 
provides an easily identifiable starting point for transcription 
of pre-crRNAs which eventually become the guides for 
Cascade complexes. Transcription the CRISPR locus into 
crRNAs was biased slightly toward spacers located close to 
the leader based on experimental research conducted by Terns 
and Terns [29]. Selection of these spacers for transcription was 
accomplished via random selection based on a probability 
distribution which assigned decreasing probabilities to spacers 
further from the leader sequence. The transcription 
relationship between RNA and DNA is shown below in Figure 
9. 
The repeat sequence denotes where spacer sequences begin 
and end in the CRISPR locus. The repeat sequence utilized in 
this model, 
‘GAGTTCCCCGCGCGAGCGGGGATAAACCG’ with a 
length of 29 nt, is described in research conducted by Luo et 
al. [30]. This repeat sequence is inserted between each spacer 
in the locus, and together these repeat sequences assist the cell 
in determining where the foreign genetic information, or 
spacers, contained in the locus begins and ends. During 
transcription of the CRISPR locus, a long pre-crRNA 
sequence is formed which is then cleaved into individual 
crRNAs which bind with Cascade complexes. These crRNAs 
contain a full spacer flanked by portions of a repeat. In the 
model explained here, the spacer is preceded by 8 nucleotides 
from the repeat, ‘AUAAACCG’, and is followed by 21 
nucleotides, ‘GAGUUCCCCGCGCGAGCGGGG’, from the 
repeat as described in [30]. For a spacer of length 32 nt with 4 
nucleotide options, there are 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 
(over 18 quintillion) possible permutations. This assumes that 
all possible permutations are valid – something which is not 
true in nature. 
The crRNA sequences are the targeting sequences which 
the Cascade complexes carry to search for foreign genetic 
material which may be a threat to the organism. Once the 
Cascade:crRNA complex encounters foreign genetic material, 
a check is performed to determine if the crRNA carried by the 
Cascade complex is complementary to any part of the foreign 
genetic material. If a subsequence of the foreign genetic 
material is complementary to the protospacer contained in the 
crRNA, the Cascade complex flags the genetic material 
provided the proper PAM sequence is present in the foreign 
genetic material. In the in vivo CRISPR mechanism of E. coli, 
this would result in either binding with the Cascade complex 
preventing expression of the information contained in the 
genetic sequence or recruitment of the Cas3 nuclease for 
degradation of the foreign genetic material. If a subsequence 
is only partially complementary to the protospacer contained 
in the crRNA, the Cascade complex might flag the genetic 
material for binding/degradation as described above, initiate 
primed adaptation and insert this nearly matching sequence 
into the CRISPR locus, or do nothing and continue its search. 
As with the first degradation/binding scenario with a fully 
complementary subsequence, the action of the Cascade 
complex is ultimately determined by the PAM sequence.  
5) PAM SEQUENCES 
PAM sequences for this CRISPR-Cas biological model were 
selected from the intermediate and interfering sets of PAMs 
described in [31]. Musharova et al. demonstrate three distinct 
variants of PAMs: stable, interfering, and intermediate. The 
contents of these PAM sets are shown in Table 1. This work 
considered 3 nucleotide length sequences for a total of 64 
possible permutations. The stable set of PAMs was the largest 
set with 36 variants, and sequences with these PAMs saw 
stable populations over the duration of the test. With an active 
CRISPR system, it can be inferred that the CRISPR 
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mechanisms did not interfere with sequences featuring these 
PAMs or utilize them for primed adaptation. The interfering 
set of PAMs contained 17 variants, and the CRISPR 
mechanism successfully interfered with sequences containing 
these PAMs. They confirmed this by monitoring the 
population of these interfering PAM-containing sequences 
which strongly decreased and remained at very low, stable 
levels. Lastly, the intermediate set contained the remaining 11 
variants which saw their relative ratios decrease over time but 
at a much slower rate than the interfering set. These population 
dynamics along with a study of the CRISPR locus confirmed 
that some sequences containing these PAMs were being 
interfered with by the CRISPR mechanism while others were 
added to the CRISPR locus via primed adaptation. This 
intermediate set is significant due to its ability to allow the E. 
coli to recognize partially matching sequences and either add 
them to the locus or promote interference. The capability to 
add near-complementary spacers to the locus is an example of 
a fuzzy logic problem in nature and enables the microorganism 
to adapt to potential mutations in viral DNA which might 
otherwise allow the viral element to evade the cell’s defense 
mechanisms. This differentiation between self and non-self 
DNA underpins the success of the CRISPR mechanism and 
the ability of the microorganism to adapt and survive. In this 
work, near-complementary refers to the similarity of two 
genetic sequences. For example, if there are two sequences 20 
nucleotides in length that are identical except for one 
nucleotide, we can say these sequences are 95% similar.  
 
TABLE I 
PAM CLASSIFICATION SETS FOR ESCHERICHIA COLI [31] 
Stable 
'ACA', 'ACC', 'ACT', 'AGT', 'CAC', 'CAT', 
'CCA', 'CCC', 'CCG', 'CCT', 'CGA', 'CGC', 
'CGG', 'CGT', 'CTA', 'CTC', 'CTT', 'GAT', 
'GCA', 'GCC', 'GCG', 'GCT', 'GGA', 'GGC', 
'GGT', 'GTC', 'GTT', 'TCA', 'TCC', 'TCG', 'TCT', 
'TGA', 'TGC', 'TGT', 'TTC', 'TTT' 
Interfering 
'AAA', 'AAC', 'AAG', 'AAT', 'AGG', 'ATA', 
'ATC', 'ATG', 'CAG', 'GAA', 'GAG', 'GGG', 
'GTG', 'TAA', 'TAG', 'TGG', 'TTG' 
Intermediate 
'ACG', 'AGA', 'AGC', 'ATT', 'CAA', 'CTG', 
'GAC', 'GTA', 'TAC', 'TAT', 'TTA' 
 
In the Python model designed alongside this work, the action 
of the Cascade:crRNA complex takes the PAM sequences into 
consideration. When this complex encounters a foreign 
genetic element like the E. coli lambda phage, a search is 
initiated which compares the crRNA spacer to the DNA of the 
phage. There are three possibilities of this search which 
include the identification of a complementary sequence in the 
phage DNA, the identification of a near-complementary 
sequence in the phage DNA, or no complementary or near-
complementary sequence found. In the first 2 cases, the PAM 
sequences following the complementary target site are 
compared to the PAM sets outline in [31]. If the sequence is 
complementary or near-complementary and the PAM 
sequence is interfering, the Cascade complex flags the entity 
for interference. Similarly, if the sequence is complementary 
and the PAM sequence is intermediate, the Cascade complex 
flags the entity for interference. If the sequence is near-
complementary and the PAM sequence is intermediate, the 
Cascade complex flags the target sequence for integration into 
the CRISPR locus. Lastly, regardless of the 
complementariness of the target sequence, the Cascade 
complex will do nothing to the entity if the PAM sequence is 
stable. In conjunction with these PAM and complementary 
sequence parameters, the action of the Cascade complex is 
determined. The manner in which the Cascade:crRNA 
complex targets the sequence of complementary genetic 
material is shown in Figure 3. 
 
FIGURE 3.  PAM and crRNA Sequences. The diagram above displays how 
a crRNA sequence targets complementary foreign genetic material with a 
specific PAM sequence. 
C. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The CRISPR-Cas biological model for simulating the flow 
of genetic information through the microorganism is 
structured as follows. First, the CRISPR locus is initialized 
and the leader sequence and first spacer are inserted. The 
foreign DNA sequence for a vector like the lambda phage is 
read in for use later in the network. Next, new spacers are 
inserted into the CRISPR locus via the naïve adaptation 
mechanism of the Cas1-Cas2 complex. These randomly 
selected spacers are acquired from a fragment file which is 
generated from subsequences of the complete foreign genetic 
sequence. After each new spacer is inserted, the repeat 
sequence is appended immediately following the spacer. Once 
naïve adaptation has occurred, the CRISPR locus is passed to 
a transcription function which determines which spacer 
sequences will be transcribed into crRNA to guide the Cascade 
complexes. Spacers closer to the locus leader sequence are 
slightly more likely to be transcribed than those further down 
the locus. Once these spacers are transcribed into crRNA, they 
are passed to the Cascade action function which compares the 
crRNA sequences to those of the phage genome to simulate 
Cascade complexes encountering genetic material from a 
vector like a bacteriophage. Depending on the PAM sequence 
and whether the sequence is fully complementary, near-
complementary, or not complementary, the Cascade action 
function counts the instances of interference, primed 
adaptation, or no action. In the case of no action, the Cascade 
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complex would continue its search for matching or similar 
genetic sequences in the microorganism.  
D. MODEL RESULTS 
This model was tested using DNA from Escherichia coli K-
12 strain MG1655 [32] and the E. coli lambda phage [34]. 
Sequences 32 nt in length were randomly selected from the 
self and phage DNA and used to prime the CRISPR locus with 
spacer sequences via naïve adaptation. These sequences were 
selected without any regard to the PAMs which followed them 
in their respective genome. Although sequences of exactly this 
length may be unlikely and their selection may not be 
completely accurate from a biological standpoint, this 
methodology was used to naïvely update the CRISPR locus to 
enable examination of the Cascade mechanism’s efficacy. 
Multiple tests were conducted using the original lambda phage 
sequence file, E. coli DNA sequence file, phage fragment file, 
host fragment file, and mutated phage file. Both fragment files 
contain 1000 32-nt length sequences randomly selected from 
their original respective files. The mutant phage files contain 
50 mutated versions of the original lambda phage file. Each of 
these mutated variants is the same length as the original phage 
sequence with a certain percentage of their genetic sequence 
mutated. For example, a 2% mutation would change 2% of the 
nucleotides to one of the three other possible DNA 
nucleotides. These mutated versions were created to simulate 
and test the interference and primed adaptation mechanisms if 
the CRISPR system encountered different variants of the same 
bacteriophage in nature. 
The first test involved 2 simulations of the CRISPR-Cas 
mechanism: one with only phage-derived spacers in the 
CRISPR locus and another with only host-derived spacers in 
the locus. The purpose of these simulations, shown below in 
Figure 4, was to investigate the nature of the naïve adaptation 
phase of the CRISPR-Cas mechanism. By comparing the 
interference and no action ratios of the Cascade complex 
between the two loci, we see on average the mechanism is 
more likely to interfere with phage DNA than self DNA; 
however, this alone does not explain CRISPR-Cas-bearing 
organism’s ability to avoid autoimmunity issues. These 
simulations demonstrate that the naïve acquisition process is 
more complex than simple random selection of spacers from 
the environment and is likely linked to specific PAMs. This 
indicates that the contents of a single PAM set from the 3 sets 
described in [31] are likely unequal in their ability to promote 
naïve adaptation. 
 
FIGURE 4.  Interference Rates Between Phage DNA and Self DNA. The 
figure displays the ratio at which the Cascade complex initiates interference 
or takes no action for phage DNA and self DNA 
 
In total, interference occurred 44% of the time when the 
spacers in the locus were solely from the host genome and 
nearly 49% of the time when the spacers were solely from the 
lambda phage genome. Correspondingly, no action occurred 
56% of the time with host genome spacers and 51% of the time 
with phage genome spacers. Primed adaptation did not occur 
for these initial simulations because neither genome was 
mutated or otherwise modified which resulted in no sequences 
similar enough to locus spacers which may have enabled 
primed adaptation. Iteration batches contain twenty individual 
iterations of the CRISPR-Cas simulation, and the 
corresponding ratios are the average of the twenty iterations’ 
ratios. 
Additional simulations were performed to investigate how 
primed adaptation might work in the CRISPR-Cas mechanism 
with different strains or mutations of a bacteriophage. Six 
separate simulations were performed, and the rates of 
interference, primed adaptation, and no action were monitored 
for each. The results of these simulations are displayed in 
Figure 5. The mutation rate of the lambda phage genome was 
set at 0.5%, 1%, and 2% in separate simulations. The normal 
PAM sets were used as described in Table 1 in half of these 
simulations while modified PAM sets were used to compare 
the performance of the CRISPR-Cas mechanism under two 
different PAM conditions. The modified PAM sets involved 
the transfer of all PAMs except ‘CCG’ from the Stable set to 
the Intermediate set. The normal PAM sets reflect those of E. 
coli in [31] while the modified PAM sets reflect a biologically-
unlikely scenario in which the only PAM sequence preventing 
interference is that of the CRISPR locus. 
As expected, the interference and primed adaptation rates 
were much higher with the modified PAM sets when 
compared to the normal PAM sets. Additionally, higher 
mutation rates led to higher rates of primed adaptation. This 
can be explained by the ability of the Cascade:crRNA 
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complex to recognize partially complementary sequences, and 
if the proper PAM is present, engage in primed adaptation. 
When there are very few mutations, there is little likelihood of 
primed adaptation due to the high number of entirely non-
complementary sequences and prevalence of entirely 
complementary sequences. Up to a certain mutation 
percentage, the primed adaptation rate will continue to 
increase as the mutation rate increases. Beyond this point, the 
mutated genetic sequences will be too different from the 
crRNA spacers carried by the Cascade complexes for primed 
adaptation to occur. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.  The Action of the Cascade:crRNA Complex Under Different 
Conditions. Mutation percentages were set to 0.5%, 1%, and 2% while both 
normal and modified PAM sets were used. (A) displays the rates of 
interference with varied mutation rates and PAM sets. (B) displays the rates 
of primed adaptation with varied mutation rates and PAM sets. (C) displays 
how frequently no action was taken by the Cascade:crRNA complex with 
varied mutation rates and PAM sets.  
 
Utilizing the results of the previous tests, the primed spacer 
acquisition totals and rates can be examined. In Figure 6, the 
primed acquisition results are displayed. As previous results 
support, the modified PAM sets promote far higher levels of 
primed adaptation. Similarly, increasing the mutation rate of 
the genome to which the locus spacers are compared results in 
higher primed adaptation spacer counts and therefore a higher 
acquisition rate. 
 
FIGURE 6.  Primed Spacer Acquisition Counts. The diagram above 
displays counts of spacers added to the CRISPR locus via primed 
adaptation for varying mutation percentages and PAM sets. 
 
One significant difference between the simulations 
presented in this work and the physical CRISPR-Cas system 
of biological organisms is in the frequency of spacer additions 
to the CRISPR locus. In general, spacers are added to the locus 
much less frequently than represented in these simulations 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
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[10]; however, this is relevant for its implications in a 
hardware security method for detection of hardware Trojans. 
The results obtained from these simulations suggest additional 
research is required to better explain primed adaptation, 
specifically the similarity required between crRNA and target 
for it to occur. A 90% similarity criteria was implemented for 
these simulations which amounts to a maximum of 3 
nucleotide deviations for two 32-nt sequences to be considered 
similar or near-complementary. The results presented 
previously also support the notion that naïve adaptation and 
spacer selection are not well-explained by random acquisition. 
Although the random acquisition of spacers did indicate that it 
led to higher levels of interference in foreign genetic 
information, it is unclear if this would be the case across a 
range of different bacteriophages, predatory bacteria, or host 
genomes. Additionally, this random acquisition led to an 
uncharacteristically high rate of interference with the host’s 
own genome, a significant autoimmunity issue. Three possible 
explanations for this phenomenon are that the organism very 
infrequently encounters fragments of its own genome leading 
to little opportunity to acquire these sequences, or that specific 
indicators are required to be downstream from the genetic 
material which could become a spacer, or that the rate of 
spacer acquisition was substantially lower than that of the 
simulation as described in [10]. 
VI. A CRISPR-CAS-INSPIRED TROJAN DETECTION 
MECHANISM 
Although a comparison was made earlier, it is important to 
note differences between a microorganism like E. coli and an 
electronic system like an FPGA. To start, the CRISPR-Cas 
mechanism of microorganisms does not play a direct role in 
changes to the organism’s own genetic code other than updates 
of the CRISPR locus; however, in FPGA systems, the 
bitstream configures the system following HDL synthesis and 
layout. In the microorganism case, it is almost never desirable 
for an external (or internal) stimulus to modify the organism’s 
genetic information because even small changes can have 
large repercussions for the organism’s ability to survive. On 
the other hand, in an FPGA system, it may be desirable for an 
update to take place which fundamentally alters the 
configuration or functionality of the system even while the 
system is running; nevertheless, the ability to adaptably detect 
Trojans in FPGA systems is a desirable trait which a CRISPR-
like mechanism is well-suited to provide.  
Despite these differences, there are other similarities 
between biological systems and hardware systems which have 
not been discussed to this point. One such similarity concerns 
the nature of hardware execution and biological functions in a 
cell. While software execution is generally described in 
sequential terms, hardware languages are typically grounded 
in constructs which are carried out in parallel [34]. Similarly, 
cells carry out many functions in parallel; even different 
aspects of the CRISPR-Cas system for monitoring foreign 
genetic material are carried out in this manner. It is then, 
perhaps, natural to investigate possible applications of 
microbiology-inspired defense and adaptation mechanisms in 
the hardware domain. While the system proposed in this 
chapter is focused more on Trojan detection than tolerance, 
CRISPR’s flexibility allows potential variations on the vanilla 
detection implementation. One example of a potential 
variation would have a CRISPR algorithm adapted to work in 
conjunction with a genetic algorithm designed to tolerate 
Trojans via evolution like the system described in [14]. This 
combination of biology-inspired systems could yield a potent, 
comprehensive system for Trojan detection and tolerance in 
FPGA devices.  
A. BEHAVIORAL LEVEL REALIZATION 
The behavioral level, or algorithmic level, of FPGA design 
flow refers to the stage at which the design is algorithmic in 
nature. This is a high-level specification of the design problem 
where the behavior is uncoupled from things like clock-level 
timing. At this stage of the FPGA design process, the design 
is at a higher level of abstraction allowing the designer to look 
at the scope of the problem with better control over design 
architecture optimization. The behavioral level is useful for 
verification by comparing the desired functionality outlined at 
behavioral level to the implemented functionality on the 
FPGA device.  
The abstract nature of this level of FGPA design limits its 
candidacy for implementation of a CRISPR-Cas-inspired 
Trojan detection system. Additionally, any detection method 
introduced at the behavioral level may be avoided by a Trojan 
injected by a sophisticated adversary at a later stage of the 
FPGA design process. Another consideration in determining 
the efficacy of a potential detection system at the behavioral 
level is the likelihood of Trojan insertion at the behavioral 
level. Because the behavioral stage of the process is when the 
problem is outlined and desired system behavior is specified, 
it is unlikely that a hardware Trojan would be inserted at this 
stage. Coupled with the low likelihood of Trojan insertion, the 
complexity of detecting a Trojan at this level makes the 
implementation of a detection system impractical at solely 
behavioral level. This is not to say that the behavioral level has 
nothing to offer for a hardware Trojan detection mechanism. 
Rather, utilizing more than one level of the FPGA design 
process for a Trojan detection system may make the detection 
system more robust and capable. 
B. RTL REALIZATION 
The RTL level of FPGA design specifies circuit 
characteristics via the operations and data transfer between 
registers. RTL code is written in HDL and is synthesizable by 
a synthesis tool. Design at this level uses an explicit clock and 
has exact timing bounds such that each process is programmed 
to occur at a specific time. While the likelihood of Trojan 
insertion at RTL may be slim, a CRISPR-Cas-inspired Trojan 
detection system implemented at this level could be effective 
for the RTL synthesis step onward. 
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Another more feasible implementation is grounded in 
principles of assertion-based verification and is described at 
RTL and implemented to function at device run-time. 
Assertions have a long history of evaluating systems for 
functional correctness. Assertion-based verification is already 
frequently used in processor design, so its method and efficacy 
has already been demonstrated elsewhere. The introduction to 
Chapter 4 discussed differences between hardware and 
software, namely that software typically executes sequentially 
while hardware is built on constructs which execute parallelly. 
Because of this, assertions in software are evaluated once the 
program execution reaches the assertion position; however, 
hardware assertions are evaluated continuously together with 
the overall system’s execution [34]. Property Specification 
Language (PSL) was developed and standardized for the 
formal specification of hardware.  
In [34], Ngo et al. present a Hardware Property Checker 
(HPC) written in PSL and synthesized with RTL code to form 
a dynamic run-time mechanism which monitors IC properties 
as a Trojan detection system. Their work built on previous 
research in run-time checking of properties to identify faults; 
however, they extend the research into the design of an HPC 
for the purpose of detecting hardware Trojans in a generic IC. 
The basis of this Trojan detection method is the monitoring of 
a circuit’s vital properties. If a monitored property is 
anomalous versus the asserted value, the HPC would be able 
to identify this and do some specified action to notify about 
the existence of a potential Trojan. An example of part of the 
property checker is shown in Figure 18. This work proposes a 
variation on the method presented by Ngo et al. to create an 
adaptive HPC system for FPGAs. The nature of an HPC is 
such that it has the capability to detect Trojans in both FPGA 
IP and hardware so long as they cause anomalies in hardware 
properties. 
HPCs are created with the aid of circuit specifications 
provided with ICs and from the study of existing hardware 
Trojans. In the circuit specification portion of HPC design, a 
CRISPR-Cas system would be possible; however, it may not 
provide additional benefits over the standard HPC design 
because circuit specifications for the FPGA itself should not 
change and have no need for an adaptive monitoring system. 
The functionality of the circuit implemented on the FPGA 
could however be monitored via an adaptive monitoring 
system like CRISPR. Specifications of the configured circuit 
on the FPGA might change depending on the circuit’s purpose 
and structure. The standard HPC design could detect Trojans 
in FPGA IP cores without the assistance of an adaptive 
component through its monitoring of the specifications 
provided by the manufacturer. Despite this opportunity for 
implementation of a CRISPR-Cas-based mechanism in circuit 
property specification, the best option within the HPC 
structure lies elsewhere. Where a CRISPR-Cas-based 
variation could provide significant improvement to HPC 
design is through the monitoring of known Trojan signatures. 
Obviously, this is limited by the number of Trojans available 
for study as described earlier. Studying hardware Trojans 
including their trigger and payload gives an idea and 
background for identifying their signatures. A traditional HPC 
would have several of these signatures hard coded into its 
design which would allow for detection of the Trojan even if 
the Trojan does not violate the circuit specifications. The 
drawback of this implementation is that a similar Trojan which 
is not accounted for in the HPC’s instantiation could be missed 
by the checker. This is the natural location for a CRISPR-Cas-
based mechanism due to its ability to recognize similar 
sequences and store these new sequences for future use. In 
order to implement this new mechanism, existing Trojans 
would need to be studied in the context of an FPGA to observe 
their properties to be able to differentiate them from normal 
circuit functionality. Successful implementation will rely on 
the ability to generate sufficiently unique signatures for 
Trojans which the CRISPR mechanism will be able to pick 
out. Altogether, the circuit verification component of the HPC 
would remain the same while the Trojan properties definition 
component would be supplemented with a CRISPR-Cas-
based mechanism to allow real-time updates and similar 
Trojan recognition. A design flow for a potential CRISPR-
Cas-based HPC is shown in Figure 7. 
 
FIGURE 7.  FPGA Design Flow. The FPGA design flow displayed above 
depicts the application design process and is broken into four levels: 
behavioral, register-transfer, gate, and bitstream. 
C. GATE LEVEL REALIZATION 
The gate level netlists are generated by a synthesis tool. At 
this level, the system characteristics are defined through 
logical links and timing properties, and all signals exist as 
discrete signals which may only have definite logical values. 
Possible operations are limited to logic primitives like AND, 
OR, NOT, etc. Because these netlists are not normally written 
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by designers, they are a more likely vector for Trojan insertion 
than previous levels of the FPGA design process. Possible 
methods of Trojan insertion at this level include soft IP cores 
(both internal and external), but unintentional vulnerabilities 
introduced in part due to the complexity of the semiconductor 
manufacturing industry can be equally devastating. Gate level 
netlists are more difficult for humans to read than HDL code 
which makes deciphering the exact contents of the netlist more 
difficult and time intensive.  
One proposed solution for detecting Trojans at gate level 
uses information-flow tracking (IFT) to prove important 
security properties at gate level (GLIFT) [35]. The GLIFT 
system is capable of detecting Trojans at RTL and gate level. 
It does so via formal verification that an information flow 
maintains confidentiality and integrity-based security 
properties. Through assignment of bit-level security labels, 
GLIFT can accurately track information flow through the 
system preventing untrusted memory locations from accessing 
things like the cryptographic key. This system represents a 
step forward from the HPC described previously because 
GLIFT takes the flow of information into account while 
formal functional property tools can check that signal A can 
take value B but do not demonstrate how information flows 
which is a major consideration in hardware security. 
Previously, the CRISPR-Cas system of Chapter 3 was shown 
to model the flow of genetic information through a system. 
From this perspective, a CRISPR-Cas-based mechanism could 
fit within the context of the GLIFT system as both are founded 
on information tracking. GLIFT relies on security theorems 
created by classification of hardware design signals into 
varying levels of security. In the vein of GLIFT, a CRISPR 
mechanism can be adopted to track the information flow in an 
FPGA. In this implementation, the CRISPR locus would have 
allowed information flows for comparison with information 
flows within the circuit. If a fault or Trojan attempts to change 
an information flow in such a manner that information is 
compromised, the CRISPR mechanism could detect this 
change.  
Similar to the HDL code analysis proposed previously, a 
gate level netlist analysis is possible using a system like that 
of Chapter 3’s CRISPR; however, the netlist is a better option 
than HDL code. Netlists are typically generated by vendor 
tools provided to function alongside the FPGA. Converting to 
a netlist from HDL will strip away some of the stylistic 
differences which can exist in HDL code despite there being 
no functional difference. If a vendor or FPGA end-user were 
to incorporate a CRISPR mechanism into netlist analysis, it 
could potentially identify hardware Trojans or faults before 
these make it to the on-device implementation. Again, the 
limitation of this mechanism would be the breadth of hardware 
Trojans and faults represented in the CRISPR locus and the 
possibility of high false positive and false negative 
identifications. A designer could incorporate an analog for 
PAM sequences into their netlists which would provide a 
signature for the CRISPR mechanism to recognize as trusted 
and reduce some of the misidentification, but this PAM analog 
would take significant consideration to create and would need 
to be kept confidential. Altogether, the gate level presents 
some intriguing opportunities for the implementation of a 
CRISP-Cas-based mechanism for detecting hardware Trojans, 
but the most straightforward implementation is at bitstream 
level. 
D. BITSTREAM LEVEL REALIZATION 
Bitstream generation is the final stage of the FPGA design 
process before the FPGA is programmed. The bitstream is 
generated following placement, routing, and timing analysis. 
The CRISPR-Cas-based Algorithm for DEtection of FPGA 
Trojans (CADEFT) analyzes the FPGA bitstream and/or 
specific hardware properties for known Trojan and fault 
signatures. CADEFT could be realized in a few different 
ways: as a part of the synthesis and implementation tools, as 
an implemented circuit on the FPGA, or as a separate, 
dedicated chip in an FPGA device. The challenge in detecting 
Trojans at the bitstream level lies in the opaque nature of 
FPGA bitstreams. Because descriptions of FPGA device 
databases are not made available by vendors, the FPGA 
bitstream formats and entire bitstreams are also unavailable 
making analysis of bitstreams and hardware security 
implementations at this level difficult. These realization 
suggestions would need to be implemented by FPGA 
manufacturers like Xilinx or utilized on an FPGA with an open 
source bitstream format. Reverse-engineering of bitstreams 
for the purpose of creating an open source bitstream 
generation tool seems to violate vendors’ end-user license 
agreements, and previous tools like JBits which allowed for 
modification of existing bitstreams are no longer supported by 
current FPGA families [36]. Researchers have demonstrated 
that despite incomplete knowledge of bitstream structure, 
malicious bitstream manipulations by an attacker are not only 
simpler than presumed but also highly potent and can result in 
key recovery by the attacker [37]. 
Realizing CADEFT in the synthesis or implementation 
tools would allow for detection of Trojans from the gate level 
and register-transfer level; however, it would not allow for 
detection of Trojans in the hardware of the FPGA. These 
Trojans from bitstream level, gate level, or RTL would need 
to pass through the bitstream to be implemented in the FPGA 
design; therefore, the bitstream is a natural place to search for 
and detect them. The CRISPR mechanism has been described 
sufficiently in previous sections, so an exhaustive explanation 
of its principles is omitted at this point. This realization 
requires looking at the bitstream as a sequence of information 
akin to DNA whose sequences encode instructions for various 
processes. The generic bitstream structure is shown in Figure 
8. When the bitstream is passed to the FPGA device, the 
configuration does not begin until the synchronization word is 
encountered which signals the upcoming configuration data. 
This means that no configuration packet will be processed in 
the FPGA until the synchronization word is found. Because 
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the FPGA will not begin configuration until this point, we do 
not need to worry about the header or dummy words. Instead, 
we can focus on the configuration words as the PAMs and the 
series of packets as the spacers from a CRISPR perspective. 
This allows monitoring of the portion of the bitstream which 
configures the FPGA. When the system encounters a signature 
in this portion of the bitstream which matches that of a known 
Trojan or a signature highly similar to a known Trojan, it can 
send an alert to the user flagging the Trojan’s location and its 
signature from which the trigger and/or payload might be 
revealed. DNA is more compact from an information storage 
perspective as the sequences are encoded in a base-4 system 
while the binary nature of bitstream is a base-2 system. 
Because of this, it is likely that spacers and PAM sequences 
for the bitstream would need to be longer, possibly 
significantly longer, than the 32 nt and 3 nt respective lengths 
in the biological CRISPR-Cas simulation. Synthesis and 
implementation tools would be well-equipped to incorporate a 
CRISPR-like mechanism for bitstream analysis as they are 
already comprehensive systems, and this could help to 
mitigate some of the risk inherent in using third-party IP cores.   
 
FIGURE 8.  FPGA Bitstream Configuration. The bitstream format varies by 
vendor, but all FPGA bitstream configurations contain a header with 
dummy words, a sync word and the FPGA configuration data. 
 
As an implemented circuit on the FPGA realized alongside 
the original design, CADEFT could detect Trojans contained 
in both FPGA bitstream and hardware. This realization would 
be a step up from the previous suggestion as it has expanded 
detection capabilities, but it also brings an added cost in the 
FPGA resources which may already be limited depending on 
the original design intent for the circuit implemented on the 
FPGA. This instance of the CRISPR-Cas mechanism would 
be realized in a similar manner to the hardware property 
checker described earlier, but this mechanism would examine 
bitstream level information for Trojans instead of RTL level 
implementation and synthesis. The bitstream monitoring 
portion of this realization would be nearly identical to the 
method discussed for the synthesis/implementation tool, and it 
would have the added functionality of viewing the real-time 
signal signatures of the FPGA as sequences for comparing to 
the signal behavior of known or similar-to-known Trojans. 
With this setup, the CRISPR-Cas mechanism would have to 
be implemented in two segments with one monitoring the 
configuration bitstream and the other focused on the run-time 
performance of the FPGA. Using benchmarks from trust-
hub.org [38], Trojan signatures can be generated via 
simulation and implementation on real FPGAs. Obviously, 
simulation signatures would be different from run-time 
implementation signatures; however, these signatures would 
not only be useful for realizing the proposed CADEFT system, 
but they would also be a tremendous asset for future Trojan 
research.  
Realizing CADEFT as an independent chip on the FPGA 
would certainly be more expensive; however, it would prevent 
CADEFT from taking up significant FPGA resources while 
providing a system capable of detecting Trojans introduced 
via bitstream or in hardware. For this separate realization to be 
effective, the independent chip would need access to the 
bitstream and to other hardware properties of the FPGA for 
monitoring and detection. This is perhaps the most resilient of 
the three detection methods described in this section as the 
dedicated chip could not only store information about known 
Trojans and newly acquired Trojans via a primed adaptation-
like mechanism, but it would also maintain a level of isolation 
from the FPGA which may be desirable to protect the 
mechanism from Trojans specifically targeting it or from 
accidental modification of the mechanism during partial 
FPGA reconfiguration. Should Trojans in hardware be a 
significant concern, this chip could be produced separately 
from the rest of the FPGA and inserted at a trusted foundry as 
is often utilized in split manufacturing techniques. It would 
also be possible to create this chip in the manner of an FPGA 
hardware core for easier reconfiguration and updated Trojan 
signature definitions. This realization would share similarities 
with a suggestion to create a reconfigurable HPC in [34]. 
These three different realizations can be implemented in 
FPGA systems to detect hardware Trojans; however, they 
would need to be adjusted for different FPGA families as the 
bitstream composition varies across vendors and FPGA 
families. This also means that a Trojan which affects one 
FPGA family may not affect another. In addition to using the 
signatures of known Trojans in the bitstream, one easy way to 
at least prime the CRISPR locus of the bitstream-based system 
would be to give the CRISPR mechanism spacers consisting 
of bitstream fragments which could physically damage the 
FPGA. In this manner, the CRISPR mechanism could also 
monitor potential faults unintentionally introduced into the 
design which could affect performance or create 
vulnerabilities. 
As mentioned previously, one major bottleneck in Trojan 
research is the lack of hardware Trojan benchmarks. Trojan 
examples are currently limited to those designed expressly for 
academic research like the trust-hub.com benchmarks in Table 
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2 [39,40]. The lack of hardware Trojans encountered outside 
the academic realm may seem reassuring, but this does not 
demonstrate that Trojans are nonexistent in modern supply 
chains. These benchmarks show that nearly all Trojans 
designed for research purposes rely on insertion in the design 
phase with RTL abstraction. While Trojan exploits are 
certainly possible at other abstraction levels, the RTL is more 
easily readable by humans than gate or bitstream abstraction 
levels. Because of the abstraction level funnel which results in 
the conversion from RTL code to gate level netlists to the 
bitstream, the bitstream is an optimal place to monitor for 
Trojans or Trojan activity. Unfortunately, bitstream formats 
are proprietary, so comparisons of Trojan-infected bitstreams 
and Trojan-free bitstreams are not available and are thus not 
presented in this work; therefore, simulation and prototyping 
of CADEFT are currently outside the scope of this paper. The 
focal point of this work is to propose a generic CRISPR-Cas-
based solution for hardware security in the realm of 
immunobiology-inspired hardware. 
 
TABLE 2 
HARDWARE TROJAN BENCHMARK EXAMPLES FROM TRUST-HUB [39,40] 
Trojan Benchmark 
Insertion 
Phase 
Abstraction 
Level 
Location 
AES T100 Design RTL Processor 
AES T1100 Design RTL Processor 
AES T500 Design RTL Processor 
AES T900 Design RTL Processor 
B19-T300 Design RTL Processor 
BasicRSA-T300 Design RTL Processor 
memctrl-T100 Design RTL Memory 
Controller Register 
File 
MC8051-T200 Design RTL Processor 
RS232-T100 Design RTL UART Core 
wb_conmax-T200 Design RTL I/O 
VII. FUTURE WORK 
This work touched on possible implementations of a 
CRISPR-Cas-inspired hardware Trojan detection mechanism; 
however, there are countless other possibilities for utilizing 
biological systems as inspiration to address issues in electronic 
systems and create novel improvements. To realize an 
effective CRISPR-Cas-inspired detection mechanism in 
hardware, one requisite step is to generate hardware Trojan 
signatures at the bitstream level. The CRISPR-Cas system 
functions effectively because spacers fulfill the role of 
signatures from various sources including phages. Generating 
Trojan signatures in bitstream format will allow full 
implementation of the CADEFT mechanism in FPGA 
devices. While somewhat limited by the availability of 
hardware Trojans, signature creation would benefit many 
hardware Trojan research efforts. As an additional step, a 
CRISPR-Cas-inspired Trojan detection mechanism or even a 
general Trojan detection mechanism could be made 
significantly more effective and accurate by examining Trojan 
signatures at different levels of the FPGA application design 
flow. By investigating characteristics within signatures at 
different levels, it may be possible to create clearer distinctions 
between Trojans and benign sections.    
VII. CONCLUSION 
This work discussed several biological mechanisms as well 
as the issue of Trojans within the hardware security domain. It 
examined the biological CRISPR-Cas mechanism present in 
organisms like Escherichia coli and how this system is a 
critical aspect of microorganism defense and adaptation. A 
biological simulation was presented which attempted to 
accurately describe and model the various phases of the 
CRISPR-Cas mechanism including adaptation, expression, 
and interference. To the writer’s knowledge, no simulation or 
model previously accounted for the flow of genetic 
information through all phases of the CRISPR mechanism. 
From creation of the simulation and analysis of the CRISPR-
Cas mechanism’s functionality, it was determined that a 
Trojan detection mechanism would be the most apt realization 
of the CRISPR-Cas system described in this work.  
The FPGA design flow was also examined to discern the 
likelihood of Trojan insertion at various levels and the 
corresponding fit of a CRISPR-Cas-inspired mechanism for 
detecting Trojans at these levels. A bitstream-level Trojan 
detection system was proposed which utilizes the information 
tracking inherent in the CRISPR-Cas mechanism to monitor 
FPGA bitstreams for the signatures of known Trojans as well 
as Trojans which share similarities with known Trojans. The 
versatility of the proposed CADEFT system is one of its 
greatest strengths when compared with other Trojan detection 
methods. The application of subcellular defense and 
adaptation mechanisms to the field of hardware security 
represents a novel development in this field. 
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